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An Elegant Solution to Network Inadequacy: How 
to Better Protect Patients from Inadequate Health 
Networks and Surprise Balance Billing 
LEAH SELBY GRAY† 
The American health care system is far from ideal. Health insurance is expensive, yet often 
inadequate, and patients can fall into bankruptcy paying for necessary medical care. Patients 
often face challenges finding physicians and other providers that accept their insurance due to 
network inadequacy, which can end up costing them thousands. Federal law offers few 
protections to patients from the costs of inadequate networks, so some states have passed 
legislation to protect patients from surprise balance bills. This Note analyzes the enduring nature 
of the network inadequacy problem and proposes an elegant solution: state single payer. While it 
would be politically and administratively challenging, a state single payer system would be the 
most efficient solution to inadequate networks and surprise balance billing. 
  
 
 †  J.D. Candidate 2019, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Production Editor, 
Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professors Jamie King and Thomas Greaney for their invaluable 
advice and guidance on this Note, as well as the Hastings Law Journal staff who work tirelessly to make our 
journal excellent. Finally, I dedicate this Note to my husband, and thank him for his endless patience and 
willingness to discuss health policy with me.  
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   INTRODUCTION 
Efforts to achieve a high-quality, low-cost health care system in the United 
States have resulted in a uniquely American combination of public and private 
payer systems. Private health insurance has long been available, but was not 
always sufficient, so the health system has slowly changed to meet the needs of 
the people.  
In Part I, this Note will analyze the inadequacies of the U.S. health care 
system, leading up to the implementation of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Part II then turns to overly narrow networks, 
exploring why and how they have become inadequate to meet patients’ needs, 
including the result of skinny networks—surprise balance billing. Part III 
addresses the minimal federal regulation on the matter, and Part IV explores 
state solutions to inadequate networks and surprise balance billing, concluding 
that regulation alone is insufficient to address consumer risks. In Part V, this 
Note will assess private sector solutions to overly narrow networks and surprise 
balance billing. Finally, Part VI concludes that states should work towards 
implementing single payer systems because current regulations and market 
solutions are not the optimal way to address network inadequacy and surprise 
balance billing. 
I.  BACKGROUND: THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM  
The U.S. health “system” consists of piecemeal federal legislation, fifty 
different sets of state laws, and hundreds of private insurers and health providers. 
It is necessary to understand how different parts of American health care evolved 
and now work together in order to understand why the United States has been 
unable to provide adequate health networks, which results in surprise balance 
billing and widespread medical debt.  
A.  THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME 
The federal government developed a few health insurance systems, which 
attempt to cover the most vulnerable members of the population while leaving 
others to obtain private insurance on their own. Congress established two public 
health insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid, in 1965, and in 1997, it 
created the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP).1 Medicare is a federal 
health insurance program for people over sixty-five years old and younger 
people with certain qualifying disabilities, while Medicaid is the insurance 
program for low-income adults, pregnant women, and those with disabilities.2 
CHIP, as the name suggests, is the federal insurance program for children whose 
 
 1. CMS Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (last modified June 20, 2018, 2:36 
PM) https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-information/History. 
 2. Medicaid, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html (last visited July 27, 
2019); What’s Medicare? MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/sign-up-change-plans/decide-how-to-
get-medicare/whats-medicare/what-is-medicare.html (last visited July 27, 2019). 
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parents’ incomes are too high to qualify for Medicaid, yet insufficient to afford 
private insurance.3 While created by the federal government, states run their own 
Medicaid and CHIP programs with varying amounts of federal funding.4 In 
particular, Medicare is broken down into four parts labeled A through D, with 
parts C and D being available through private insurers that contract with 
Medicare.5 Furthermore, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) regulates the insurance plans employers provide to their employees.6 
The way Medicaid, CHIP, and Medicare’s four parts cover different groups of 
people through such different mechanisms, and how some health plans are 
regulated federally but others are left exclusively to state regulation, highlights 
the fragmented nature of federal health care.  
Ballooning health care costs in the 1990s and 2000s finally led to the 
passage of the ACA in 2010, which imposed new requirements on individuals 
and insurers and regulated the private insurance market.7 The ACA gave states 
the opportunity to expand Medicaid to cover low-income individuals who are 
technically above the poverty line, and thirty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia have elected to do so.8 In addition, the ACA created platforms, 
referred to as the marketplace or exchanges, for people to shop for and compare 
health plans.9 The ACA categorizes plans into metal tiers, based on actuarial 
values, with bronze being the least expensive and providing the thinnest 
coverage, and platinum being the most expensive and providing the most 
comprehensive coverage.10 While twenty-eight states let the federal government 
run the marketplaces, twelve states have established their own marketplaces, and 
the remaining states use a hybrid of state and federal marketplaces.11 Thus, even 
 
 3. Eligibility, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/eligibility-standards/index.html (last 
visited July 27, 2019). 
 4. Children’s Health Insurance Program, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/chip/index.html 
(last visited July 27, 2019); How Original Medicare Works, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-
medicare-covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/how-original-medicare-works (last visited July 27, 2019); 
Medicaid, supra note 2. 
 5. MEDICAID.GOV, supra note 2. 
 6. Fact Sheet: What Is ERISA?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., https://www.dol.gov/ 
agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa (last visited July 27, 2019).  
 7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 8. Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-
uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-medicaid/; Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: 
Interactive Map, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 26, 2019) https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-
medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/. 
 9. Sarah Kliff, What Is a Health Insurance Marketplace?, VOX (Jan. 5, 2017, 2:33 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/cards/obamacare/what-is-a-health-insurance-exchange. 
 10. What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care Act Mean, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2011) 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/what-the-actuarial-values-in-the-affordable/. 
 11. State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-marketplace-types/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B 
%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#note-2 (last visited July 27, 2019). For 
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with the ACA, the type and quality of health plans, and the method by which 
people purchase them, vary greatly across states. This variability allows for more 
diverse plans and systems, which lead to inadequate health networks.  
B.  FORMS OF PRIVATE HEALTH PLANS 
The fall of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) catalyzed the ACA 
because it revealed that the market could not control rapidly rising health costs.12 
HMOs provide private health insurance plans that restrict enrollees to a limited 
network of providers and exclusively pays for care received from those 
providers.13 HMOs typically pay in-network providers a capitated amount per 
member per month, meaning they receive a flat rate per enrollee regardless of 
what services they actually provide.14 HMOs gained popularity in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, but were met with a strong backlash in the later 1990s as their 
exclusive networks prevented patients from receiving care from any provider 
they chose, and in some cases, even necessary care within their networks.15 As 
consumer advocates protested limited networks, they also revealed the financial 
insolvency of many HMOs.16 The lack of patient choice and the financial 
problems with HMOs led to state regulation on HMO solvency and health 
coverage, and a shift away from HMOs.17 
In the wake of the HMOs’ failures, preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs) emerged as the more popular option.18 Unlike HMOs, PPOs do not limit 
their enrollees to a specific network of providers; however, enrollees do have to 
pay different prices based on the providers they choose.19 Unlike the capitated, 
flat fee structure of HMOs, PPOs typically reimburse providers using a fee-for-
service model.20 PPOs gained huge popularity in the 2000s, but while they afford 
patients more choice, the fee-for-service reimbursement structure was one of the 
main reasons health care costs spun out of control.21 The ACA was necessary to 
address the rapidly rising cost of healthcare from HMOs and then PPOs. 
 
example, California runs its own marketplace called Covered California. What Is Covered California?, COVERED 
CAL., https://www.coveredca.com/what-is-covered-california (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 12. Deborah Farringer, Everything Old Is New Again: Will Narrow Networks Succeed Where HMOs 
Failed?, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 299, 311 (2016).  
 13. Id. at 305. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 307. Some of the HMO networks were so limited that patients had to go out of network in order 
to get medically required treatment.  
 16. Id. at 308–09.  
 17. Id. at 308–310. Forty-seven states enacted legislation based on the 2003 National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) HMO Model Act. Id. at 309, 309 n.51. 
 18. Id. at 310. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 311. 
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C. THE IMPACT OF THE ACA 
Before the ACA, insurance companies could determine which patients to 
insure and at what price, so they often avoided insuring those who would need 
the most care.22 For instance, insurers could refuse to offer coverage to 
individuals with “pre-existing” conditions or only agree to do so at an 
astronomically high cost.23 Historically, some states required health insurers to 
cover certain types of benefits, but the ACA made it illegal across the United 
States to discriminate on the basis of any pre-existing conditions.24 The ACA 
also requires health plans to cover certain “essential health benefits.”25 Because 
insurance companies now have to cover all individuals, regardless of health 
status, the ACA forced insurance companies to change the way they were doing 
business and making profits. 
As a result, national spending on health insurance increased.26 This rise, 
however, was supposed to be temporary, as experts assumed the individual 
mandate would bring costs down in the long term.27 The individual mandate in 
the ACA was the requirement that all qualifying citizens must have health 
insurance or pay a tax penalty.28 Insurance companies make their profits on 
premiums paid by healthy people who do not use the majority of services that 
the insurance would cover. However, sick people need a lot of care, so they are 
more expensive to insure. When healthy people are in the pool of those insured, 
the health plans can pay for the care of those who are really sick without having 
to raise overall premiums.29 The individual mandate is a contentious but 
necessary part of the ACA, as it keeps the system from falling into a “death 
spiral.”30 If the only people buying insurance are those who are sick, premiums 
 
 22. Elena Gordon, Pre-Obamacare, Preexisting Conditions Long Vexed States and Insurers, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://khn.org/news/pre-obamacare-preexisting-conditions-long-vexed-states-
and-insurers/. 
 23. Id.; MARK A. HALL & PAUL B. GINSBURG, A BETTER APPROACH TO REGULATING PROVIDER NETWORK 
ADEQUACY 2–3 (USC-Brookings Schaeffer Initiative for Health Policy ed., 2017).  
 24. John V. Jacobi, et al., Health Insurer Market Behavior After the Affordable Care Act: Assessing the 
Need for Monitoring, Targeted Enforcement, and Regulatory Reform, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 109, 114–15 (2015); 
Pre-Existing Conditions, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-aca/pre-existing-
conditions/index.html. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-6(a) (2012), 18022(b)(1) (2012). Essential health benefits include ambulatory 
patient services, emergency services, hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance 
use disorder services (including behavioral health treatment), prescription drugs, rehabilitative and habilitative 
services and devices, laboratory services, preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management, 
and pediatric services (including oral and vision care). 
 26. Janet Weiner et al., Effects of the ACA on Health Care Cost Containment, LEONARD DAVIS INS. OF 
HEALTH ECON., Mar. 2, 2017, at 1–2, https://ldi.upenn.edu/brief/effects-aca-health-care-cost-containment. 
 27. Harold Pollack, 30 Economists: We Need Individual Mandate, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (July 18, 
2013), https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/2013/07/18/30-economists-we-need-the-individual-mandate. 
 28. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (holding the individual mandate 
constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress’s taxing powers). 
 29. Pollack, supra note 27 (“The mandate expresses a basic obligation of citizenship as well as an economic 
reality. Without the mandate, some people will choose to gamble or to free-ride, undermining the fairness and 
financial stability of the health insurance system.”). 
 30. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 619. 
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skyrocket and health insurance becomes as expensive as paying health costs out 
of pocket.31  
While Congress was unable to repeal the ACA in 2017, the 2017 Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act removed the penalty for qualifying individuals who choose not to 
buy health insurance.32 The penalty removal was expected to cause a sharp 
increase in insurance premiums and out-of-pocket limits as healthy individuals 
leave the pool of enrollees, resulting in a version of the death spiral as predicted 
would happen if the ACA was originally enacted without the individual 
mandate.33 However, the markets have been remarkably stable, indicating 
support for the ACA’s reforms and that healthy people, on the whole, still see 
the value of health insurance.34 Premiums actually went down one percent, but 
experts note that given the current strong economy consumers would have seen 
a much greater decrease had Congress not removed the tax penalty.35 Overall, 
the lack of an individual mandate indicates that 2018’s stability was probably 
temporary, and consumers should expect increased prices and decreased 
coverage over the next few years if nothing changes. 
II.  THE NETWORK ADEQUACY PROBLEM 
Given the fragmented, insufficient, and inconsistent nature of healthcare 
policies in America, it will come as no surprise that there are flaws in the system 
which harm consumers. One of the biggest problems facing patients is 
inadequate provider networks, and the crippling debt that comes from surprise 
balance billing. 
A.  THE EMERGENCE OF SKINNY NETWORKS36 
As a result of these rising costs caused by increased regulation and healthy 
individuals leaving the market, consumers have been increasingly drawn to less 
expensive plans, creating a market for inexpensive, overly narrow networks, also 
known as “skinny networks.”37 As explained previously, health plans typically 
include a network of covered providers where patients can receive care from an 
in-network provider, which the plan will cover with lower cost sharing than out-
of-network providers. Skinny networks simply have fewer providers in the 
network and occur in HMOs, PPOs, or other plan structures.38 Insurance 
 
 31. Pollack, supra note 27. 
 32. An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the 
Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017); Timothy Jost, The Tax Bill and the 
Individual Mandate: What Happened, and What Does it Mean?, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20171220.323429/full. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Sarah Kliff, Obamacare is Having a Surprisingly Good Year, VOX (Nov. 26, 2018, 4:35 PM),  
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/11/26/18113313/obamacare-mandate-tax. 
 35. Id.  
 36. In the context of this Note “skinny networks” will be used to describe overly narrow networks. 
 37. See Farringer, supra note 12, at 313–14.  
 38. Id. at 310–11. 
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companies started offering skinny network plans as a way to bring down their 
costs and increase competition, as they would have to pay a smaller number of 
providers.39 The insurance market has responded to the high demand for less 
expensive plans, and skinny networks have become extremely popular.40  
In theory, narrow networks provide cheaper health plans and increase 
market competition between providers, producing higher quality and less 
expensive care.41 The lower costs result from lower reimbursement rates, as 
providers agree to accept less money per enrollee or service rendered in 
exchange for the plan’s promise to deliver a steady stream of patients who can 
only get care from that provider. Because such a steady stream of patients is an 
attractive offer, providers should compete with each other to be the one the 
insurance company decides to accept in the network. That provider competition 
should ensure that only the highest quality and fairly priced providers are in the 
skinny network. However, patients can experience grave medical and financial 
consequences from inadequate network coverage. 
B.  PROS AND CONS OF SKINNY NETWORKS 
The problem with skinny networks is that they are, by their nature, 
inadequate. An adequate network should provide plan enrollees with easy access 
to a sufficient number of in-network providers so that the enrollee can receive 
the health services covered by the plan.42 For healthy patients who do not need 
as much care, very narrow networks are perfectly adequate to meet their needs. 
Yet, problems arise when those healthy patients suddenly need specialized care 
not covered by the network, or if sick patients unwittingly choose a skinny 
network. 
Proponents of skinny networks praise their low costs while maintaining 
high-quality care and encouragement of market competition.43 Some even refer 
to skinny networks as “high performance networks.”44 Those who favor skinny 
networks point to the fact that they emerged in response to market demands, not 
the greed of insurance companies that drove the rise of HMOs.45 When networks 
are forced to be too broad, health insurers lose the ability to negotiate lower 
prices with providers.46 The threat of being excluded from narrow networks 
 
 39. Dan Polsky & Janet Weiner, The Skinny on Narrow Networks in Health Insurance Marketplace Plans, 
LEONARD DAVIS INS. OF HEALTH ECON., June 2015, at 1, https://ldi.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/the-skinny-
on-narrow-networks.pdf. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See David Blumenthal, Reflecting on Health Reform—Narrow Networks: Boon or Bane?, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Feb. 24, 2014) http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014/feb/ 
narrows-networks-boon-or-bane. 
 42. See Erin C. Fuse Brown, Consumer Financial Protection in Health Care, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 127, 
144 (2017). 
 43. Farringer, supra note 12, at 311. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. at 313–14. 
 46. Katherine Baicker & Helen Levy, How Narrow a Network Is Too Narrow? 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 
337 (2015). 
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should motivate providers to offer efficient and cost-effective care to compete 
with other providers.47 In fact, one of the Nation’s leading health economists 
found that narrow networks have reduced premiums for enrollees, while 
maintaining a high quality of care.48 
Yet for all the benefits of skinny networks, just as many, if not more, 
consequences exist. As insurers work to keep their premiums low, the least 
expensive plans may exclude specialists and highly-regarded academic medical 
centers in the narrow networks, preventing sick patients from accessing 
necessary and sometimes experimental care.49 Proponents of skinny networks 
focus on the premium rates, but do not take into account how expensive using 
out-of-network providers can be, which is not reflected in the premiums.50 Plans 
may intentionally exclude specialists to discourage already sick or injured 
patients from enrolling.51 Unfortunately, patients enrolling in plans with skinny 
networks are often unaware they are doing so; thus, patients who need a lot of 
specialized care may inadvertently enroll in a plan that fails to provide for their 
needs.52 While the ACA requires all plans to cover essential health benefits, it 
does not mandate that the plan has to provide those benefits through an in-
network provider. Alternatively, healthy patients may knowingly pick skinny 
networks, optimistically ignoring the possibility of a tragic accident or 
diagnosis.53 Patients choose skinny networks for their cheap price tag, but that 
rate is deceptive when patients need out-of-network care.54 
 
 47. Leemore S. Dafny, et al., Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Marketplaces: Prevalence, 
Pricing, and the Cost of Network Breadth, 36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1606, 1607 (2017). 
 48. Id.; see also Farringer, supra note 12, at 331–32. 
 49. See Valarie Blake, Narrow Networks, the Very Sick, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act: Recalling the Purpose of Health Insurance and Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 63, 68 (2015). 
 50. See Dafny, supra note 47, at 1608; see also HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.   
 51. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3.  
 52. See Blake, supra note 49, at 113. Blake explains that:  
Narrow networks present a number of ethical and legal challenges for patient care, especially 
access to tertiary care given that it is often life-saving, typically constitutes an essential health benefit, 
and is not currently being considered in the law despite the providers of such care being most 
frequently excluded from narrow networks. 
Id. An additional problem stems from a lack of “health literacy,” as patients struggle to meaningfully compare 
plans and navigate America’s notoriously complex health care system. See Brietta Clark, Using Law to Fight a 
Silent Epidemic: The Role of Healthy Literacy in Health Care Access, Quality & Cost, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
253, 259 (2011). The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services recognizes the problem and defines health 
literacy as the extent to which individuals have “the capacity to obtain, process and understand basic health 
information and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.” Health Literacy Improvement, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION AND HEALTH PROMOTION (last updated July 
24, 2008), https://health.gov/communication/literacy/default.htm. 
 53. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3. 
 54. The problem is particularly pronounced in the individual market. Those who do not get health insurance 
through their employer are left to choose plans for themselves, and insurers are taking advantage of people’s 
ignorance about how health networks function. See Katherine Hempstead, Marketplace Pulse: Percent of Plans 
with Out-of-Network Benefits, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.rwjf.org/en/ 
library/research/2018/10/percent-of-plans-with-out-of-network-benefits.html. In the group markets, the share of 
employers choosing skinny plans for their employees has been decreasing over the past few years. Drew Altman, 
Narrow Health Care Networks Aren’t Actually That Common, AXIOS (Oct. 12, 2018), 
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 C.  SURPRISE BALANCE BILLING  
Surprise balance billing is the most harmful consequence of skinny 
networks. Patients with skinny networks often do not realize they are receiving 
out-of-network care until it is too late—when they have received a bill for an 
out-of-network provider. This kind of bill is called a surprise balance bill. The 
surprise typically occurs when a patient seeks care from an in-network provider, 
but then receives some tangential service from an out-of-network provider or 
facility.55 For example, a patient may receive an x-ray at her in-network 
provider, but the image could be sent to a non-contracting radiology facility for 
diagnosis, resulting in a surprise balance bill from the radiology center. The 
“balance” in surprise balance billing refers to the fact that a health plan may 
cover a nominal amount of an out-of-network service, but the patient must pay 
the balance on the bill. 
D.  HOW SURPRISE BALANCE BILLING OCCURS 
The rise in balance billing is directly caused by the narrowing of networks. 
While narrow networks are an effective way to reduce insurance company costs 
and enrollee premiums, they can harm patients who need specialized care from 
particular out-of-network providers.56 Skinny networks lead to greater 
fragmentation in health care delivery and much higher costs for patients who 
need out-of-network specialists.57 Accordingly, patients have seen a rise in 
surprise balance billing as insurance networks use skinny networks to keep their 
own corporate costs down in the face of increased compliance costs and present 
lower up-front premiums to enrollees.58 
Surprise balance billing often arises in emergency contexts, but is actually 
more common in non-emergency situations.59 Frequently, in an emergency 
someone calls an ambulance and the ambulance takes the patient to the nearest 
hospital, which happens to be outside the patient’s network.60 Surprise balance 




 55. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 137 (“[T]he three common characteristics of a surprise medical bill are 
that it is unanticipated, involuntary, and out-of-network.”).  
 56. Blake, supra note 49, at 68.  
 57. Id. at 114–15. 
 58. With the increase in regulation from the ACA, insurers have to spend more time and money assessing 
whether they meet the requirements of each regulation. 
 59. Karen Pollitz, Surprise Medical Bills, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar 17, 2016), 
https://www.kff.org/%20private-insurance/issue-brief/surprise-medical-bills (“90% of surprise medical bills 
were not for emergency services, but for other in-hospital care.”); see also LIZ HAMEL ET AL., THE BURDEN OF 
MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION/NEW YORK TIMES MEDICAL BILLS SURVEY 
4 (2016), https://www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/8806-the-burden-of-medical-debt-results-from-the-
kaiser-family-foundation-new-york-times-medical-bills-survey.pdf (reporting that 61% of surprise billing came 
from emergency room visits, while 65% of surprise billing came from routine doctor visits). 
 60. See Pollitz, supra note 59. 
 61. Id. 
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knee surgery with his in-network surgeon at an in-network facility. After the 
surgery, the patient receives a surprise balance bill from the surgical assistant. 
While the patient’s plan covered the surgeon, the surgeon brought in a non-
contracting assistant.62 Although the patient did everything he could to stay in 
network, he was still left to pay this surprise balance bill. On average, out-of-
network surgical assistants bill $13,914, while health plans only pay $1794, 
leaving the unsuspecting patient to pay over $12,000.63 Unfortunately, the 
problem is not limited to surgical assistants. Surprise balance billing often results 
from non-contracting anesthesiologists, radiologists, pathologists, and their 
respective facilities. 64 Many providers choose not to join networks because they 
can make more money by directly billing patients, instead of getting the lower, 
negotiated rate from the plans. 
E. THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF BALANCE BILLING 
Providers can charge anything they choose for out-of-network care, 
making the bills often exorbitant, and as such, can cause burdensome medical 
debt for even those with insurance.65 Balance bills are often unexpected because 
the system is so opaque that even the savviest consumers may not be able to 
predict if their care will be in-network. A recent study revealed about thirty 
percent of insured patients who had a problem paying their medical bills say the 
bill came from an out-of-network provider, and almost seventy percent of those 
people were unaware the provider was not in their network at the time they 
received the care.66  
Surprise balance billing particularly harms patients because payments to 
non-contracting providers do not count towards deductibles or out-of-pocket 
limitations, such as co-pays or co-insurance payments.67 A deductible is the 
amount a plan enrollee pays out-of-pocket before the health plan covers the rest 
of the health care for the year.68 A co-pay is typically a nominal amount that the 
plan requires patients to pay when they go to see their primary care physician, 
specialist, or visit a hospital for emergency services.69 Out-of-pocket costs 
include deductibles and co-pays, but not the premium enrollees pay to have the 
insurance.70 Plans typically have an out-of-pocket maximum, which means that 
 
 62. “Non-contracting” refers to a provider or entity with which a health plan does not have a contract 
setting forth the prices the plan will pay for certain procedures. Without a contract, providers may charge the 
patient any price they choose.  
 63. Pollitz, supra note 59. 
 64. Id. 
 65. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 59, at 14 (“Among those with medical bill problems, almost identical shares 
of the insured (44 percent) and uninsured (45 percent) say the bills have had a major impact on their families.”). 
 66. Id. at 12. 
 67. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 141. 
 68. What’s the Difference Between a Deductible and an Out-of-Pocket Limit?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Dec. 
6, 2013, 8:41 PM) https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2013/12/what-s-the-difference-between-a-
deductible-and-an-out-of-pocket-limit/index.htm. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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a plan cannot charge an enrollee co-pays and deductibles once they have reached 
the maximum for the year.71 Because insurance companies do not count balance 
bills towards the out-of-pocket maximum, there is no limit on what patients can 
be liable to pay for those bills.72 
Medical debt devastates the finances of many Americans as they drain their 
savings to pay for their health care.73 Patients with large medical bills report 
reducing their spending on food, clothing, and household necessities, increasing 
their credit card debt, and taking on second jobs to pay their bills.74 As 
previously mentioned, people making these sacrifices to pay for medical care 
often have insurance, but their insurance does not cover all the care they need.75  
Given the harmful nature of inadequate networks and surprise balance 
billing, both the private sector and legislatures have responded with solutions. 
Since the ACA was enacted, the federal government has begun to regulate 
network adequacy, but has not yet solved the problem of surprise balance billing. 
As such, the most effective solutions have come from the private sector and the 
states. 
III.  FEDERAL REGULATION 
The federal government’s attempts to regulate network adequacy have 
been limited by the language of the ACA, and perhaps by an inclination of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to delegate this difficult 
issue to the states.76 Furthermore, ERISA limits the ability of state protections 
from applying to all of the state’s citizens. 
A.  THE ACA 
The ACA includes some statutory language about network adequacy,77 but 
does not set out requirements for what constitutes an adequate network, and 
delegates the responsibility of regulating network adequacy to CMS.78 However, 
the Trump Administration recently transferred that duty from CMS to the 
states.79 Health experts fear that the states are currently unprepared to take on 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 138. 
 73. HAMEL ET AL., supra note 59, at 15. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. See Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 155. 
 77. See 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012). 
 78. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012). 
 79. Mark Hall & Caitlin Brandt, Network Adequacy Under the Trump Administration, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170914.061958/full. Hall and Brandt 
report: 
Under the Obama administration, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) reviewed 
all qualified health plans (QHPs) in the ACA market in states that did not operate their own 
exchanges. Through this review process, CMS ensured that all QHPs on the federally facilitated 
exchanges met basic quantitative standards designed to ensure network adequacy. . . . With this final 
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this regulation, as most have relied on the federal government, choosing not to 
establish their own network adequacy standards.80 Especially with the federal 
government putting the regulatory burden on states, experts predict skinny 
networks are not going away anytime soon.81  
While overly narrow networks are a nationwide problem, the federal 
government has done nothing to address surprise balance billing. In fact, as the 
ACA explicitly exempts balance billing from its cost-sharing provisions, CMS 
has no statutory authority to create regulations that would protect patients from 
surprise balance billing.82 Balance billing statutes are integrally linked with cost 
sharing. As the ACA excludes “balance billing” from its definition of cost 
sharing, CMS cannot create a regulation that touches on surprise balance billing. 
Thus, only states have the capability to protect patients from surprise balance 
billing. 
B.  ERISA PREEMPTION 
Yet, even the most robust state solutions cannot protect all patients, 
because ERISA prevents state protections from applying to the large proportion 
of Americans who get their health insurance through employer-sponsored health 
plans. ERISA completely preempts many state protections, including state 
balance billing laws.83 Many people get their health insurance through their 
employer, and those plans are governed by ERISA.84 The “black hole” of ERISA 
makes it so patients who are insured through an employee benefit plan are not 
protected from surprise balance bills, even in states like California and New 
York.85 
C.  POTENTIAL FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
As exorbitant surprise medical bills grab the media’s attention, Congress 
is considering legislation to address the problem.86 After President Trump 
 
rule, the Trump administration eliminated this federal review process, ceding network adequacy 
regulation to the states, even those that might prefer to wash their hands of the process. 
Id. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Market Stabilization, 82 Fed. Reg. 18346 (Apr. 
18, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156). 
 80. Sarah Hansard, Many States Not Prepared to Regulate Health Plan Networks, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 
8, 2017), https://www.bna.com/states-not-prepared-n57982084915. 
 81. Farringer, supra note 12, at 304; Justin Giovannelli & Ashley Williams, Regulation of Narrow 
Networks: With Federal Protections in Jeopardy, State Approaches Take on Added Significance, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND, (Feb. 2, 2017) www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2017/feb/regulation-
of-narrow-networks. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(3)(B) (2012); Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 155. 
 83. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 184. 
 84. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 6.  
 85. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 194. For a detailed discussion of ERISA as it relates to patient protections 
and possible federal solutions, see id. at 183-199. 
 86. For example, Sarah Kliff from Vox has been investigating emergency bills and reporting on them since 
December 2018, and the Kaiser Family Foundation has an ongoing project with NPR called “Bill of the Month.” 
See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, I Read 1,182 Emergency Room Bills This Year. Here’s What I Learned., VOX (Dec. 18, 
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expressed his support for a solution to this problem, it seems increasingly likely 
that the federal government could reach a bipartisan agreement.87 As of July 
2019, there are two bills in the Senate and one in the House, modeled on 
successful State legislation.88 If one of these bills, or something similar, is 
enacted, it would go a long way to protect patients insured by their employers. 
 IV. STATE REGULATION 
States have had varying levels of success in regulating networks, which has 
demonstrated the necessity of striking a careful balance between over and under-
regulating. In states with little to no regulation, patients remain vulnerable to 
surprise balance billing because of their unregulated narrow networks. However, 
there is a danger in applying too stringent a standard. The best state laws regulate 
network adequacy as well as surprise balance billing, while giving regulators 
some flexibility in their enforcement. 
A.  NETWORK ADEQUACY LAWS 
The goal of network adequacy laws is to ensure an appropriate number of 
providers within each network to meet the needs of those patients. States have 
crafted legislation to achieve this goal in a variety of ways. Some focus on 
qualitative measures, others on quantitative, while the best network adequacy 
laws use both.89 Other states have focused on requiring plans to inform the 
insured about the size and scope of their network.90 Yet, for all the effort states 
have put into such laws, networks remain inadequate. States have difficulty 
enforcing the laws for all plans, gathering the information needed to stay 
updated, and effectively informing patients of their options. 
There are three types of quantitative measures of network adequacy: 
minimum ratios of providers to enrollees, minimum time or distance to travel to 
certain providers, and maximum wait times.91 Each is important in its own way 
as they serve slightly different functions. While some states will only use one of 
these measures, some states, such as California, use all three.92 This 
comprehensive approach provides the most effective way to use quantitative 
 
2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/health-care/2018/12/18/18134825/emergency-room-bills-health-care-
costs-america; Sarah Kliff, A $20,243 Bike Crash: Zuckerberg Hospital’s Aggressive Tactics Leave Patients 
with Big Bills, VOX (Jan. 24, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/7/18137967/er-
bills-zuckerberg-san-francisco-general-hospital; Julie Appleby, Meow-ch! The $48,512 Cat Bite, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 27, 2019), https://khn.org/news/biologist-faces-48512-bill-for-rabies-shot-after-cat-bite.  
 87. Shefali Luthra & Emmarie Huetteman, Bipartisan Support Builds For Limits On Surprise Medical 
Bills, NPR (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/02/05/691374149/ 
bipartisan-support-builds-for-limits-on-surprise-medical-bills.  
 88. Id. Two bills would follow the California model and impose payment standards, while the other would 
take the lead from New York and impose an arbitration system to determine the correct amount of payment.  
 89. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 12.  
 90. Id. at 7. 
 91. Id. at 7–8. 
 92. Id. at 8, exhibit 2. 
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measures, as it allows regulators to see the broader picture from multiple 
viewpoints. California refers to its combination of these qualitative standards as 
“timely access” laws.93 
California’s timely access laws attempt to ensure patients can obtain 
necessary services in a reasonable amount of time.94 California is one of the few 
states that divides its regulation of health plans between two agencies, the 
California Department of Insurance (CDI) and the California Department of 
Managed Health Care (DMHC).95 CDI promulgates regulations applying to 
health insurers.96 Health insurance plans must provide a certain number of 
doctors per insured in the area; however, few standards exist for how far away 
providers can be, and the hours per week during which emergency and non-
emergency providers must be available.97 Similarly, DMHC requires the 
managed care plans under its purview to have providers within a reasonable 
distance who can adequately serve the enrolled patients.98 The corresponding 
regulations also require health plans to ensure a certain number of providers for 
enrollees, a certain number of hours of provider availability per week, and 
timelines for when a patient must receive different types of appointment after 
requesting one.99 The requirements differ for emergency and non-emergency 
care, but not for specialties.100 If plans in California cannot comply with the 
timely access laws, they cannot sell plans in the state. 
However, these timely access requirements in California come with 
arduous reporting standards for the health plans and insurers and place a heavy 
regulatory burden on CDI and DMHC.101 Insurers and health plans must 
constantly file reports on network adequacy, which CDI and DMHC must 
review and investigate. These standards are therefore burdensome to enforce as 
the regulators have to gather “a daunting amount of information,” including 
checking to see if each individual provider is still in the network and accepting 
new patients.102 Even when agencies enforce the standards and maintain the 
directories, patients with low health literacy still struggle to make use of the 
resources given to them.103 While other states have network adequacy 
 
 93. Timely Access to Care, CA.GOV, DEP’T OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE, (last accessed May 12, 2019), 
https://www.dmhc.ca.gov/HealthCareinCalifornia/YourHealthCareRights/TimelyAccesstoCare.aspx. 
 94. Id. 
 95. MAKING SENSE OF MANAGED CARE REGULATION IN CALIFORNIA, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. 5 
(2001), https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PDF-MakingSenseManagedCareRegulation.pdf. 
 96. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133.5 (West 2019).  
 97. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2240.1 (2019). 
 98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367 (West 2019). 
 99. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§ 1300.67.2, 1300.67.2.2 (2019). 
 100. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28, §§ 1300.67.21–1300.67.2.2 (2019). 
 101. CAL. CODE REGS. tit.10, § 2240.1(l) (2019); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 28 § 1300.67.2.2(g) (2019); JANE 
WISHNER & JEREMY MARKS, ENSURING COMPLIANCE WITH NETWORK ADEQUACY STANDARDS: LESSONS FROM 
FOUR STATES 7–8 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88946/2001184-ensuring-
compliance-with-network-adequacy-standards-lessons-from-four-states_0.pdf. 
 102. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 156.  
 103. See generally Helen Levy & Alex Janke, Health Literacy and Access to Care, 21 J. HEALTH COMMC’N. 
(2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4924568/.  
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requirements, their lack of staffing makes their similar standards difficult to 
enforce.104 California’s DMHC regulates the largest market in the country and 
is the only state which has full-time staff devoted solely to evaluating network 
adequacy.105 Even so, it is a never-ending task for the regulators to ensure 
compliance with the network adequacy laws. 
In some states with quantitative standards to regulate network adequacy, 
the standards only apply to certain types of plans, leaving other types of plans 
completely unregulated by the quantitative requirements.106 Often, when states 
regulate certain types of plans but not others, the regulations only apply to 
HMOs, as the regulations are left over from the HMO backlash in the 1990s.107 
When quantitative regulations are limited to HMOs, the states fail to regulate 
the now more popular PPOs and other similarly structured plans.108  
In addition to doing their own monitoring, regulators depend on consumer 
complaints to assess network adequacy.109 However, consumers with low health 
literacy often do not understand how to file complaints, grievances, or appeals 
when faced with problems with provider access.110 In all likelihood, a large 
number of patients face inadequate networks and subsequent balance billing, but 
fail to report it to regulators because they do not know how. Accordingly, 
regulators have no access to that data and are unable to help solve the problem.111 
Another focus of network adequacy laws has been to increase transparency, 
although the effect of these efforts has been limited by the health literacy 
barriers.112 Most general efforts to address transparency in health care have been 
directed towards price transparency.113 In terms of network adequacy, states are 
increasingly using provider directories to increase transparency.114 Provider 
directories theoretically give patients a database to look at the providers in their 
area, determine who is accepting new patients, and assess which provider is right 
for them.115 However, the providers are not responsible for updating their own 
information, the regulators must do continual research to keep the directory 
 
 104. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 7–8. 
 105. Id. at 8. 
 106. See HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 4. Sixteen states have quantitative standards that apply to all 
plans, eleven states have quantitative standards that apply only to plans such as HMOs, and the remaining 
twenty-three states do not use quantitative measures of network adequacy. Id. 
 107. See id. at 1, 4. 
 108. See id. at 4. 
 109. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 10. 
 110. See id.  
 111. See id.  
 112. See Blake, supra note 49, at 93. 
 113. See, e.g., Ateev Mehrotra et al., Defining the Goals of Health Care Price Transparency: Not Just 
Shopping Around, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (June 26, 2018) https://catalyst.nejm.org/health-care-price-
transparency-goals/; Andis Robeznieks, 8 Ways to Improve Health Care Price Transparency, AM. MED. ASSN. 
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/economics/8-ways-improve-health-care-
price-transparency. 
 114. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (2018). 
 115. Blake, supra note 49, at 93. 
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accurate.116 Unfortunately, these directories do not have to be constantly updated 
and the frequency of the updates depend on the jurisdiction.117 Furthermore, 
patients with low health literacy have a difficult time finding these directories, 
and when they do, they do not understand how to meaningfully compare the 
providers.118 While provider directories can be useful and do increase 
transparency, they are burdensome on regulators, and have limited value given 
the frequency with which they are updated and whether patients can effectively 
utilize them. 
Regulators require flexibility in enforcing network adequacy laws.119 
Exceptions and waivers are critical when enforcing network adequacy using 
quantitative measures.120 Regulators must be able to look at the market factors 
in play and assess which plans need exceptions.121 Rural communities often need 
exceptions, as a strict application of network adequacy standards may disqualify 
every plan in a rural area.122 Giving regulators flexibility on quantitative 
standards also allows for the development of modern medical innovations, such 
as telemedicine.123 When quantitative standards are applied strictly in rural 
areas, the providers could have extraordinary bargaining power over the plan, as 
the plans would have no choice but to include the providers to meet the 
requirements.124 If all the plans in a rural area are deemed inadequate, that means 
there are no health plans at all for individuals who live in those communities.125 
In that case, an inadequate plan is better than no plan.  
B.  ANY WILLING PROVIDER LAWS 
An alternative approach has been to encourage larger networks by using 
“any willing provider” laws; however, states have had limited success in 
enforcing them. For example, South Dakota recently implemented an “any 
willing provider” law through a ballot measure.126 The statute requires health 
insurers to accept all providers within the geographic coverage area who are 
willing and qualified to meet the terms and conditions of participation as 
 
 116. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 156.235 (2018). 
 117. See id. Blake, supra note 49, at 93; Some states, such as California, require more frequent updates. See, 
e.g., WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 9. 
 118. See INST. OF MED., COMM. ON HEALTH LITERACY, HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END 
CONFUSION 42, tabl. 2-1 (LYNN NIELSEN-BOHLMAN ET AL. EDS., 2004). Many patients do not understand what 
they require in a provider and fail to anticipate their future health needs when selecting a plan. HALL & 
GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 3. 
 119. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 6–7. 
 120. Id. at 7. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See id.  
 123. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 17. 
 124. Id. at 6. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Ashley Noble, Any Willing or Authorized Providers, NCSL (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/ 
research/health/any-willing-or-authorized-providers.aspx. 
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established by the plan.127 This law successfully and severely limits plans in 
South Dakota from using skinny networks.128 Yet, it also prevents insurance 
companies from negotiating lower prices with providers and facilities, so they 
are less able to contain costs for enrollees and cannot disqualify providers based 
on quality; hence “any willing provider” laws have been highly criticized.129 
“Any willing provider” legislation alone is an insufficient solution to the 
problem of overly narrow networks, as it fails to reduce costs for consumers, 
there is no guarantee that providers will ask to join the networks, and plans have 
no ability to control the quality of providers with whom they contract. 
C.  BALANCE BILLING PROTECTIONS 
Even when states have network adequacy standards that they try their best 
to enforce, those standards do not eradicate the problem of balance billing. 
Network adequacy laws, such as California’s, only create minimum 
requirements, but do not eliminate skinny networks.130 When paired with 
surprise balance billing laws, network adequacy standards can protect patients 
from financial harm. Balance billing laws range from fully comprehensive to 
ineffective in practice. The best laws include set reimbursement standards for 
non-contracting providers, and mandate dispute resolution mechanisms which 
do not involve the patient.131 Less effective laws simply notify patients that they 
may receive care from out-of-network providers, apply only to emergency 
balance bills, or otherwise fail to explain what a prohibition on balance bills 
looks like in practice, allowing plans and providers to easily avoid the laws and 
continue charging higher rates.132 
California passed a prohibition against surprise balance billing in 2016.133 
The statute requires all health plans and insurers to cover these out-of-network 
costs by reimbursing “the greater of the average contracted rate or 125 percent 
of the amount Medicare reimburses,” also known as the default rate.134 The 
enrollee only pays the “same cost sharing that the enrollee would pay for the 
same covered services received from a contracting individual health 
professional.”135 Patients are taken out of the equation as the providers and 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Baicker & Levy, supra note 46, at 2. 
 129. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 5–6; See Baiker & Levy, supra note 46, at 2. 
 130. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 147. 
 131. See id. at 178.  
 132. See Jack Hoadley et al., State Efforts to Protect Consumers from Balance Billing, THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/state-efforts-protect-
consumers-balance-billing.  
 133. Assemb. B. No. 72: Health Care Coverage: Out-of-Network Coverage, ch. 492 (Cal. 2016) (codified 
as amended at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1371.30, 1371.31, 1371.9 (West 2019), CAL. INS. 
CODE §§ 10112.8, 10112.81, 10112.82 (West 2019)). 
 134. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.31(a)(1) (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.82(a)(1) (West 
2019). 
 135. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(a)(1) (West 2017); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(a)(1) (West 
2019). 
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health plans must use a binding independent dispute resolution process to 
resolve payment disputes.136 A patient may waive her rights to the balance 
billing protection if she chooses to use a non-contracting provider or facility.137 
However, the statute protects patients by requiring a binding written estimate of 
the cost and written consent twenty-four hours in advance, so patients are never 
surprised with a balance bill.138 While these California protections safeguard 
patients, they necessarily create even more government overhead, and impose 
compliance costs on health plans and providers. 
Only eight other states have such comprehensive patient financial 
protections as California, although California’s are arguably one of the 
strongest, with New York coming in as a close second.139 Only California and 
New York have both payment standards for all out-of-network care and dispute 
resolution processes.140 New York pioneered state laws to protect consumers 
from the harmful practice of balance billing.141 Like California, New York 
prohibits surprise balance billing of patients, requiring written consent when a 
patient wants to use a non-contracting provider.142 It also established standards 
for determining a reasonable fee and imposed a binding dispute resolution 
process for providers and insurers when either party disputes a proposed fee.143 
New York has served as a successful model of patient financial protection before 
even the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), and states 
like California have taken note of its success. 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and more recently New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Oregon have also adopted comprehensive 
approaches to balance billing.144 Comprehensive protections apply to both 
HMOs and PPOs in emergency and in-network hospital settings, holding 
consumers harmless from surprise balance bills, and creating adequate payment 
standards or a dispute resolution process so non-contracting providers receive 
payment for their services.145 These standards have proven fairly effective in 
protecting patients, although there are problems in establishing appropriate 
payments for non-contracting providers.146 The problem with lacking either a 
 
 136. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.30 (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.81 (West 2019). 
 137. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1371.9(c) (West 2019); CAL. INS. CODE § 10112.8(c) (West 2019). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Hoadley et al., supra note 132132; see also Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 151–52; Kevin Lucia et al., 
Balance Billing by Health Care Providers: Assessing Consumer Protections Across States, 16 THE 
COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 3 (2017), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-
brief/2017/jun/lucia_balance_billing_ib.pdf (analyzing balance billing protections in the United States). 
 140. See Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 149, 151–52. 
 141. Id. at 149. 
 142. N.Y. FIN. SERV. §§ 603, 606 (McKinney 2019). 
 143. N.Y. FIN. SERV. §§ 604, 607 (McKinney 2019). 
 144. Hoadley et al., supra note 132.  
 145. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 4. 
 146. Id. at 4. 
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payment standard or dispute resolution process is that patients get dragged into 
the disagreement.147  
When working within complicated regulatory frameworks that deal with 
network adequacy and balance billing, external review processes are crucial. 
There are two types of processes: external review of a patient’s request for 
necessary medical care and dispute resolution about the payment for that care.148 
When patients require care from out-of-network specialists, states should 
impose an external review process to ensure fair determinations as to whether 
the plan should cover those services.149 Around half the states have such 
processes, but several require multiple internal reviews before a patient can 
reach the external review, which can impede the patient’s timely access to 
care.150 Once that external reviewer determines the patient needs out-of-network 
care, states should have a clear and just system for determining an appropriate 
payment without patient involvement.151 
Fifteen other states have a limited approach to preventing surprise balance 
billing, but most only pertain to emergency services, which, as discussed above, 
is woefully insufficient, as ninety percent of surprise balance bills occur in non-
emergency contexts.152 Some states, like Colorado, do not prohibit surprise 
balance bills, but only provide hold harmless provisions, which can confuse 
patients who do not understand that they do not have to pay the bill.153 Other 
states, such as Texas, limit the protection to HMOs, when most of its citizens 
have PPOs.154 The biggest problem for states with only limited protections on 
surprise balance billing is the lack of dispute resolution mechanisms or payment 
standards.155 These gaps in the laws and regulations have led providers to abuse 
the system, charging even higher prices to insurance companies and patients.156 
Yet the situation is even worse in the other twenty-nine states that lack any such 
protections for their citizens. In those states, patients can be blindsided with 
massive surprise balance bills, with no recourse but to pay them at the cost of 
their own financial security.  
 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. HALL & GINSBURG, supra note 23, at 13, 16. 
 149. Id. at 13. 
 150. Id. at 13, n.51. 
 151. Id. at 13; Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 6. 
 152. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 4; Pollitz, supra note 59. 
 153. Lucia et al., supra note 139, at 6. A hold harmless provision is a “requirement that insurers pay 
providers their billed charges or some lower amount that is acceptable to the provider.” Id. at 4. 
 154. Id. at 4. 
 155. Id. at 6. 
 156. Id. According to Lucia et al.:  
Providers have used this lack of specificity to charge high amounts to insurers, who must pay the 
balance bill to avoid consumer liability, resulting in higher overall health costs. In New Jersey, for 
instance, the absence of a standard may encourage providers to remain out of network—by opting 
not to accept a discounted payment rate with an insurer—and then charge higher prices through 
balance billing, potentially contributing to the state’s high hospital charges and high premiums. 
Id. 
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D.  MODEL LEGISLATION 
The NAIC created a Network Adequacy Model Act in 2015 in response to 
the narrowing of networks after the implementation of the ACA.157 The NAIC 
did not intend for states to adopt the Model Act exactly as written, but to shape 
it to fit the needs of the individual state.158 However, four states (Colorado, 
Georgia, Hawaii and Maryland) adopted it in its entirety.159 The Model Act 
requires that all health plans “shall maintain a network that is sufficient in 
numbers and appropriate types of providers, including those that serve 
predominantly low-income, medically underserved individuals, to assure that all 
covered services to covered persons, including children and adults, will be 
accessible without unreasonable travel or delay.”160 While the Model Act 
identifies an important goal, it fails to provide standards for achieving that 
goal.161 
In addition to regulating network adequacy, the Model Act also touches on 
balance billing. It includes a provision which requires health plans to have a 
“process to assure that a covered person obtains a covered benefit at an in-
network level of benefits, including an in-network level of cost-sharing, from a 
non-participating provider” when the circumstances require a patient to be out 
of network.162 In theory, this should eliminate the practice of surprise balance 
billing, but the Model Act does not fully prohibit balance billing.163 Even when 
states adopt the Model Act in its entirety, they still cannot completely protect 
patients.164  
V.  PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS 
Where state protections are often inadequate, the private sector has stepped 
in with its own solutions. Health systems have been engaging in different levels 
of integration, with varying degrees of success for patients and system profit 
margins. For the large population of Americans who get their health insurance 
from their employer, the employing companies have the market power to protect 
their employees from overly narrow networks and surprise balance bills.  
 
 
 157. HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN NETWORK ACCESS AND ADEQUACY MODEL ACT (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMM’RS 2015) [hereinafter NAIC MODEL ACT], http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-74.pdf. 
 158. NAIC MODEL ACT §§ 1, 2. 
 159. State Legislative Brief, NAIC (Dec. 2018), http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
cmte_legislative_liaison_brief_network_adequacy.pdf. 
 160. NAIC MODEL ACT § 5(A)(1). 
 161. WISHNER & MARKS, supra note 101, at 4. 
 162. NAIC MODEL ACT § 5(C). 
 163. Fuse Brown, supra note 42, at 154.  
 164. See id. 
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A.  VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION 
Many advocates argue for a more integrated private health care system, 
which would solve some of the problems with balance billing and improve 
coordination of care.165 There are two types of integration: horizontal and 
vertical. Horizontal integration occurs when one entity engulfs another that 
provides roughly the same product or service, for example, the consolidation of 
two physician practices.166 Vertical integration entails the merger of two entities 
that operate in different sectors of the market, such as a hospital and a physician 
group.167 Hospitals have been acquiring physician practice groups, which have 
also increased in size over the past few years.168 With more contracting 
physician practices, there is a decreased chance that a patient will have to go 
outside his network to obtain necessary diagnosis or treatment. Because patients 
can remain in-network with larger physician practices, they are less likely to be 
balance billed. Supporters of greater hospital-physician integration argue that it 
lowers costs—as care is coordinated within one system—while simultaneously 
improving quality of care.169  
On the other hand, too much consolidation leads to abuses of market 
power.170 Indeed, research suggests that hospital acquisition of physician 
practices leads to a fourteen percent price increase per group acquired, with even 
higher prices being reported when the acquiring entity has a large share of the 
patient market.171 Furthermore, as entities leverage their vertical integration into 
horizontal monopolies, they provide lower quality care as they lack the 
competition that requires them to compete to provide the best quality of care at 
an optimal price.172  
Kaiser Permanente is a successful model of a fully vertically integrated 
health system.173 Kaiser has its own hospitals, medical groups, and health plans. 
 
 165. David C. Szostak, Vertical Integration in Health Care: The Regulatory Landscape, 17 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 65, 69-71 (2015). 
 166. Miriam J. Laugesen & George France, Integration: The Firm and the Health Care Sector, 9 HEALTH 
ECON., POL’Y & L. 295, 298 (2014). 
 167. See id. at 296. 
 168. Cory Capps et al., The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions of Physician Practices on Prices and Spending, 
59 J. HEALTH ECON. 139, 139–140 (2018).  
 169. Id. at 140. 
 170. See Reed Abelson, The Face of Future Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/business/kaiser-permanente-is-seen-as-face-of-future-health-care.html. 
 171. Capps et al., supra note 168, at 151. Some doctors who have seen the system evolve argue we should 
fix payment systems that reward high prices and excessive service use (fee-for-service payments, for example), 
instead of focusing on vertical integration. Robert Berenson, A Physician’s Perspective on Vertical Integration, 
36 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1585, 1588 (2017). 
 172. See generally Marah Noel Short & Vivian Ho, Weighing the Effects of Vertical Integration Versus 
Market Concentration on Hospital Quality, MED. CARE RES. & REV. (Feb. 9, 2019); Eric C. Schneider, Provider 
Mergers: Will Patients Get Higher Quality or Higher Costs?, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2015/provider-mergers-will-patients-get-higher-quality-or-higher-
costs. 
 173. Szostak, supra note 165, at 71–72. Yet, given antitrust laws, even Kaiser is not a completely vertically-
integrated health care system as defined by Szostak. 
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Kaiser and its health plans function as a very large HMO, with a very broad 
network. Kaiser members do not receive surprise balance bills for planned 
procedures, because it is impossible for them to unknowingly interact with non-
contracting providers or facilities. However, a Kaiser patient could still 
encounter the situation of being transported to a non-Kaiser hospital in the event 
of an emergency, where they would be billed according to the state policies on 
emergency care. While some patients dislike Kaiser because it does not allow 
them to choose any doctor or hospital they want, Kaiser’s incredibly broad 
network covers the needs of almost all of its patients without them ever having 
to go out of network.174 A closed network system like Kaiser’s can be 
appropriate as long as it is sufficiently broad. However, while Kaiser is one of 
the best solutions from the private sector, it is not a flawless system. Kaiser has 
not been immune to the overall rising costs of health care; premiums have been 
rising steadily over the past twenty years, including Kaiser Health Plans.175 
When patients are surprise balance billed, they experience financial harm. Even 
if they are in the Kaiser system and avoid such bills, they still feel the effect of 
overall rising costs of health care when they pay increasingly large premiums 
and co-payments.  
B.  STRUCTURING AND CHOOSING HEALTH PLANS 
Companies that purchase health plans for their employees have a lot of 
market power, which they can use to address network inadequacy problems. 
Healthy employees are more productive employees, so many businesses have 
started to focus on their employees’ wellbeing.176 Large and successful 
companies have started to offer plans with broad coverage to their employees to 
better take care of their employees.177 These large entities have the market power 
to make wide-network plans more affordable to ensure that their employees are 
never out of network, and never get left with a surprise balance bill.178 
Unfortunately, small employers do not have the same market power and may 
struggle to obtain sufficiently broad network plans that protect their employees, 
 
 174. Abelson, supra note 170. If, for example, a patient wants experimental or specialized care from a 
certain facility outside of the Kaiser network, the patient would pay for that treatment entirely out of pocket. 
Furthermore, like almost all health plans and health systems in the United States, Kaiser struggles to deliver 
convenient care to its rural members. Access to health care in rural areas is an issue this Note does not attempt 
to address. For an in-depth look at policy in this area, see Nicole Huberfeld, Rural Health, Universality, and 
Legislative Targeting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (2018).  
 175. Premiums and Worker Contributions Among Workers Covered by Employer-Sponsored Coverage, 
1999-2018, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.kff.org/interactive/premiums-and-worker-
contributions-among-workers-covered-by-employer-sponsored-coverage-1999-2018/. 
 176. See generally Leonard L. Berry et al., What’s the Hard Return on Employee Wellness Programs?, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2010), https://hbr.org/2010/12/whats-the-hard-return-on-employee-wellness-programs. 
 177. See, e.g., Laura Lorenzetti, These 11 Companies Offer 100% Healthcare Coverage, FORTUNE (Mar. 
11, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/11/companies-offer-all-healthcare-coverage. 
 178. See Patricia A. McDonald et al., The Employer-Led Health Care Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. (July–
Aug. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/07/the-employer-led-health-care-revolution (arguing that employers have the 
market power necessary to make changes to the healthcare system).  
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which leaves those employees with only their state’s protections to shield them 
from balance bills. 
VI.  PROPOSAL: STATE SINGLE PAYER 
America’s traditional combination of regulation and market competition is 
failing in the health care sphere. The health insurance and provider markets are 
highly concentrated with large players wielding too much market power.179 
Because these few companies control so much of the market, they have little 
incentive to lower their premiums and negotiate better deals with providers.180 
Without an effective market to bring down costs, regulations alone are 
insufficient and unwieldy. A state-run single payer, “Medicare for All” system 
similar to Canada’s would solve the problem of overregulation and insufficient 
market competition.181 In such a system, all citizens of the state would be insured 
through a state health plan; no one would be insured on the individual market or 
through their employers.  
A.  THE BENEFITS OF STATE SINGLE PAYER  
State single payer health care would eliminate the problems of surprise 
balance billing, as patients would not be required to pay for their health care out-
of-pocket. If state insurance covered all licensed providers, a patient would 
effectively never be able to go out-of-network within the state. The single payer 
solution is elegant, unlike the current system. Healthcare at the state and federal 
levels remains fragmented and massively convoluted, meaning a lot of money 
goes into unnecessary overhead costs. When a single entity provides and 
regulates the health insurance of all citizens, it can greatly reduce the overall 
administrative costs.182 There would be no tangled web of health plans and 
insurers who contract with different providers, medical groups, facilities, 
employers who provide health plans, and multiple regulatory authorities 
governing all parties. By streamlining the health care payment system, states 
could make significant reductions in costs for its citizens. 
In addition, establishing a system where the patient does not have to worry 
about the adequacy of her network or how she will pay for a certain procedure 
may actually increase health outcomes.183 Teaching health literacy is a less 
daunting task when educators do not have to instruct people about how to ensure 
that the care they need will actually be covered. Furthermore, lower levels of 
 
 179. Leemore S. Dafny, Are Health Insurance Markets Competitive?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1399, 1400–
1401 (2010). 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Sara Allin & David Rudoler, The Canadian Health Care System, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, 
https://international.commonwealthfund.org/countries/canada/ (last visited July 27, 2019).  
 182. Jonathan Oberlander, The Virtues and Vices of Single-Payer Health Care, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1401, 
1402 (2016). 
 183. See Clark, supra note 52, at 256. 
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health literacy lead to lower access to care,184 perhaps in part because people are 
afraid they will be unable to pay for it. There is a correlation between low health 
literacy and poorer health.185 Creating a single payer system will increase access 
to preventative care and other necessary treatment, which will improve the lives 
of patients and lower the overall cost on society. 
There is also a compelling moral argument for single payer. Health care 
should be a human right, not a privilege for the wealthy.186 People should not be 
able to fall into bankruptcy because they had the audacity to get sick. In the 
preamble to its constitution, the World Health Organization declared that “[t]he 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition.”187 The United Nations recognized the “right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including . . . medical care” in its 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.188 Yet 70 years later in 2018, people in the United States still bankrupt 
themselves in order to obtain necessary medical care.  
B.  THE OBSTACLES TO STATE SINGLE PAYER 
One of the biggest obstacles to a state single payer system is the cost, and 
states need to be able to reapportion federal Medicaid and Medicare funding.189 
The ACA has an innovation waiver provision that went into effect in 2017, 
enabling states to continue receiving the aggregate federal funding that would 
have gone to individual residents and to use that funding to finance a new 
system.190 This section 1332 waiver allows states to address problems stemming 
from the removal of the individual mandate penalty and more comprehensively 
address balance billing and network adequacy using federal funding. Some 
states have already used these waivers and are implementing new programs.191 
However, the section 1332 waivers likely would not give states sufficient 
flexibility to fully implement a state single payer system. California’s new 
 
 184. Id. at 268. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See generally Mariah McGill & Gillian MacNaughton, The Struggle to Achieve the Human Right to 
Health Care in the United States, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 625 (2016). 
 187. WORLD HEALTH ORG., BASIC DOCUMENTS: CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 1 
(45th ed. 2006).  
 188. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, A Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 189. For example, single payer in California is estimated to cost $400 billion. Patricia Cohen & Reed 
Abelson, Single-Payer Health Care in California: Here’s What It Would Take, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/25/business/economy/california-single-payer.html; Chad Terhune, Tab for 
Single-Payer Proposal in California Could Run $400 Billion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 23, 2017), 
https://khn.org/news/tab-for-single-payer-proposal-in-california-could-run-400-billion/. 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012); McGill & MacNaughton, supra note 186186, at 666.   
 191. Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers. 
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governor, Gavin Newsom, already called for federal legislation which would 
allow for a new type of waiver.192 
Favorable public opinion is also crucial to successfully implementing a 
single payer system in any state. People across the country are confused about 
what “Medicare for All” means, and reasonably so as individual politicians 
define it differently.193 Once political leaders agree on what kind of system they 
want to implement, they will need to be able to effectively communicate the 
nature and cost to their constituents in order to garner their support. Not only is 
the actual cost of single payer an obstacle, but citizens’ perception of that cost 
impacts the feasibility of such a system. Creating a state single payer system will 
be politically challenging and administratively difficult, but Democratic-
majority states might just have the motivation to achieve it.  
C.  THE LIMITATIONS OF STATE SINGLE PAYER 
Unfortunately, state single payer systems will not be a panacea for 
America’s health care woes. Those in rural communities will still have trouble 
getting care, even if all providers are covered by their state’s insurance system. 
The state government will need to take on the administrative work currently 
being done by insurance. While this will likely be a more efficient system in the 
long term, insurance companies will have to lay off employees, find new 
business, or go out of business entirely. Policymakers will have to consider how 
to ensure that providers still compete with each other to maximize quality and 
innovation. In doing so, they should not limit themselves to a Canadian model, 
as Canada’s system is currently being challenged by those who say its strict ban 
on private supplementary insurance violates Canadian’s constitutional 
guarantees to certain human rights.194 Indeed, the current U.S. system may be 
more conducive to reforms following the Bismarck model as used in countries 
like Germany and Japan, which maintains private insurance.195 Yet, a single 
 
 192. Letter from Gavin Newsom, Cal. Governor, to Donald J. Trump, President, et al. (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/1.7.19-Letter-to-the-White-House-and-Congress.pdf. 
While it might seem unthinkable that a Republican controlled Senate and White House would ever agree to such 
legislation, Newsom’s request might be compatible with the kind of state control Republicans have long wanted 
for health care. See Shefali Luthra, Everything You Need to Know About Block Grants—The Heart of GOP’s 
Medicaid Plans, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2017), https://khn.org/news/block-grants-medicaid-faq. 
 193. See Ashley Kirzinger et al., KFF Health Tracking Poll–January 2019: The Public on Next Steps for 
the ACA and Proposals to Expand Coverage, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-
reform/poll-finding/kff-health-tracking-poll-january-2019/; Ezra Klein, Democrats’ Confused, and Confusing, 
Medicare-for-All Debate, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/2/5/18209945/medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders-kamala-harris-cory-booker-single-payer. 
 194. See Chaoulli v. Quebec, 2005 SCC 35, paras. 273–78, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 (Can.) (holding the 
prohibition on private insurers, giving citizens no alternative to avoid excessively long wait times to access care, 
violated the Canadian and Quebec Charters); Cambie Surgeries Corp. v. British Columbia, 2018 BCSC 2084, 
para. 189 (temporarily enjoining the enforcement of the private insurance ban in British Columbia following the 
reasoning in Chaoulli), appeal denied 2019 BCCA 29 (Can.). 
 195. The Bismarck model is a multi-payor model, but heavily regulates the private insurers to contain costs 
and ensure universal coverage. Summary of International Health Systems, PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH 
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payer system would most efficiently eliminate out-of-network bills, because all 
providers would be in network. Single payer will not be a flawless system, nor 
will it be painless to implement. However, on the whole, it will get patients the 
care they need without imposing burdensome medical debt.  
CONCLUSION 
Working within the framework of the current U.S. health system, there are 
many solutions available for states to protect their citizens from the financial 
harm of medical treatment and bills. The private sector can look to the Kaiser 
model of health integration, which prevents patients from being out of network, 
but they should be cautious to avoid the problems of monopolistic acquisition of 
physician practices. The limited approach to balance billing protection taken by 
many states is insufficient. States can look to California and New York to create 
balance billing protections and network adequacy standards that actually protect 
citizens. Yet ERISA prevents even the most robust state protections from 
actually protecting all citizens. The time is right for states to begin exploring the 
option of state-run single payer health care systems. While it would be a 
complicated and daunting enterprise, establishing a single payer system would 
solve the problems of inadequate networks and surprise balance billing. States 
should be the great laboratories of democracy and discover what it would look 
like to have a single payer system in the United States. 
  
 
PROGRAM (Apr. 2011), http://caphysiciansalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/International-
Comparison.pdf. 
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